Ought a moral claim be falsifiable?
We accept that unfalsifiability is a reason to reject a view as unscientific. Thanks to Karl Popper, we can now really look down on mystical mumbo-jumbo like astrology on the grounds that it is unfalsifiable as well. I know that it is a leap to say that we should be able to expect the same thing from a moral theory--that it be falsifiable. Indeed, if we do, then it will beg the question of whether moral progress is really possible at all--although, based on my analogies between the philosophy of science and social mores, moral progress does indeed seem possible. The hierarchical ethic does indeed seem like it was falsified by observations made possible by the emergence of capitalism.
But what was the actual structure of that falsifiability, which made the hierarchical ethic falsifiable in the first place? Essentially, the hierarchical ethic presupposed a metaphysics that admitted of falsifiable claims. It was presupposed that everyone had an intrinsic worth. We would expect, for example, that someone of low birth could never be fit for the aristocracy, because they would have less intelligence, grace, or whatever the given criterion was. The society was static, with people not elevating or lowering their positions over time. Consequently, we would expect that a system like capitalism simply would not work. People would display no upward mobility towards higher classes, because they would not have the intelligence, competence, or whatever was the given criterion that determined their intrinsic worth. Conversely, we would also expect that people born into the aristocracy would naturally stay there forever. But under capitalism, it didn't matter how rich you started off being. If you became economically less competitive than your peers, then you would lose your social status in the hierarchy, as Marx recognised. Of course, what Marx did not emphasise was that members of the lower and middle classes were now capable of elevating their own class status. This upward and downward mobility was not something that a hierarchical ethic could explain. It constituted a falsification of the metaphysics that the hierarchical ethics presupposed.
Does utilitarianism, therefore, presuppose a metaphysics that admits of falsifiable claims? No, it does not, because it is not possible to falsify the claim that a given practice will actually maximise social utility. At least, not in the terms in which social utility is generally construed. For example, it is a common objection to Benthamite utilitarianism that no-one can know what will conduce to the greatest happiness of the greatest number of people. Therefore, any action at all might be justified in terms of this principle, and the claim about the utility of the action cannot convincingly be falsified. It is simply that the typical recourse of the utilitarian under those circumstances is to prey on the moral intuitions of his audience. Thus he will claim that an action of which his audience already morally disapproves does not maximise social utility. An action of which his audience does approve, does. Yet viewed for what it is, this technique only serves to negate the moral validity of the principle of utility. It only works in the first place because of an appeal to moral intuitions that do not pertain to social utility, in order to claim that the actions approved by those intuitions in fact do maximise social utility.
Hence, merely calling oneself a utilitarian gives us no indication of the moral position that one may take. We must first suppose some extra-utilitarian moral position that one holds in order to know what actions one will recommend. In the case of Singer, he is a socialist. In the case of Adam Smith, who did not use the word 'utilitarianism' but who nevertheless does appeal to social utility, he is a capitalist. In the case of John Stuart Mill, who advocated the cultivation of individual character and liberty, he is an Aristotelian. But utilitarianism cannot be determinate towards any real moral content, so if nothing else, it seems excess baggage for any real moral theory to contain. As an unfalsifiable ethic, therefore, utilitarianism seems to be at least misleading. It can be used to justify almost any moral viewpoint, as long as the moral intuition in question is shared by both speaker and audience. Note, however, that the real moral intuitions being appealed to in the case of utilitarianism are therefore hidden. Singer would have us believe that in order to be utilitarians, we must be socialists, but we could just as easily use Mill's appeals to social utility to be Aristotelians.
The result of this is an obfuscation of true moral reasoning. The unfalsifiable claims of utility ensure that the real moral issues at stake, such as freedom, dignity, murder, or any number of other extra-utilitarian moral concepts, never get elucidated or explicitly reasoned. On the extra-utilitarian moral issue, only the emotions are really appealed to, in order to make the action seem to maximise or not maximise utility. Because the emotions of the audience are thus getting manipulated, utilitarianism is really just a disguised form of emotivism. The emotions of the speaker determine what he really thinks is socially useful, and the emotions of the audience are being appealed to through the appeal to utility. The unfalsifiability of utilitarianism is a hindrance to real progress in understanding of real moral issues.
Hence, some form of falsifiability seems important to a moral claim. Of course, the question therefore, remains to spell out in what way a moral claim must be falsifiable, and this will require another section to discuss.
But what was the actual structure of that falsifiability, which made the hierarchical ethic falsifiable in the first place? Essentially, the hierarchical ethic presupposed a metaphysics that admitted of falsifiable claims. It was presupposed that everyone had an intrinsic worth. We would expect, for example, that someone of low birth could never be fit for the aristocracy, because they would have less intelligence, grace, or whatever the given criterion was. The society was static, with people not elevating or lowering their positions over time. Consequently, we would expect that a system like capitalism simply would not work. People would display no upward mobility towards higher classes, because they would not have the intelligence, competence, or whatever was the given criterion that determined their intrinsic worth. Conversely, we would also expect that people born into the aristocracy would naturally stay there forever. But under capitalism, it didn't matter how rich you started off being. If you became economically less competitive than your peers, then you would lose your social status in the hierarchy, as Marx recognised. Of course, what Marx did not emphasise was that members of the lower and middle classes were now capable of elevating their own class status. This upward and downward mobility was not something that a hierarchical ethic could explain. It constituted a falsification of the metaphysics that the hierarchical ethics presupposed.
Does utilitarianism, therefore, presuppose a metaphysics that admits of falsifiable claims? No, it does not, because it is not possible to falsify the claim that a given practice will actually maximise social utility. At least, not in the terms in which social utility is generally construed. For example, it is a common objection to Benthamite utilitarianism that no-one can know what will conduce to the greatest happiness of the greatest number of people. Therefore, any action at all might be justified in terms of this principle, and the claim about the utility of the action cannot convincingly be falsified. It is simply that the typical recourse of the utilitarian under those circumstances is to prey on the moral intuitions of his audience. Thus he will claim that an action of which his audience already morally disapproves does not maximise social utility. An action of which his audience does approve, does. Yet viewed for what it is, this technique only serves to negate the moral validity of the principle of utility. It only works in the first place because of an appeal to moral intuitions that do not pertain to social utility, in order to claim that the actions approved by those intuitions in fact do maximise social utility.
Hence, merely calling oneself a utilitarian gives us no indication of the moral position that one may take. We must first suppose some extra-utilitarian moral position that one holds in order to know what actions one will recommend. In the case of Singer, he is a socialist. In the case of Adam Smith, who did not use the word 'utilitarianism' but who nevertheless does appeal to social utility, he is a capitalist. In the case of John Stuart Mill, who advocated the cultivation of individual character and liberty, he is an Aristotelian. But utilitarianism cannot be determinate towards any real moral content, so if nothing else, it seems excess baggage for any real moral theory to contain. As an unfalsifiable ethic, therefore, utilitarianism seems to be at least misleading. It can be used to justify almost any moral viewpoint, as long as the moral intuition in question is shared by both speaker and audience. Note, however, that the real moral intuitions being appealed to in the case of utilitarianism are therefore hidden. Singer would have us believe that in order to be utilitarians, we must be socialists, but we could just as easily use Mill's appeals to social utility to be Aristotelians.
The result of this is an obfuscation of true moral reasoning. The unfalsifiable claims of utility ensure that the real moral issues at stake, such as freedom, dignity, murder, or any number of other extra-utilitarian moral concepts, never get elucidated or explicitly reasoned. On the extra-utilitarian moral issue, only the emotions are really appealed to, in order to make the action seem to maximise or not maximise utility. Because the emotions of the audience are thus getting manipulated, utilitarianism is really just a disguised form of emotivism. The emotions of the speaker determine what he really thinks is socially useful, and the emotions of the audience are being appealed to through the appeal to utility. The unfalsifiability of utilitarianism is a hindrance to real progress in understanding of real moral issues.
Hence, some form of falsifiability seems important to a moral claim. Of course, the question therefore, remains to spell out in what way a moral claim must be falsifiable, and this will require another section to discuss.
Comments