Moving back in the empirical direction
I think that the problem in the previous section is that these farfetched examples carry no empirical validity. The only way to form reliable intuitions is through experience, and this entails that we move back in the empirical direction.
In that case, then what work has been done with moral anthropology?
Looking up "'moral anthropology' bibliography" on Google, I got this striking web page: The introduction to a forthcoming book by Patrick Frierson called Freedom and Anthropology in Kant's Moral Philosophy. It addresses an objection by Friedrich Schleiermacher to a work by Kant in 1798, called Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. The objection is that the work treats anthropology as having moral import, when Kant already makes clear in his Foundations that he is committed to claiming that anthropology can have no moral import. Perhaps this, then, was what the external reviewer meant by the "rather robust empiricism to be found in the Theory of the Virtues". In any case, the first chapter will have to take this view into account. It seems that Kant was not as rationalist as the standard interpretation of him makes him appear.
If I am going to rewrite Chapter 2 in this light, I will also have to address another concern. I have in fact rewritten the section of the thesis that dealt with Christian virtue, so that it is in line with Classical Greek virtue rather than Kantian virtue. I think that Kelley L. Ross makes a good point that Christian virtue is very much in keeping with Classical Greek virtue a la Plato. As such Kant was trying to rescue Christian ethics from this predicament. This was a relatively easy part of the chapter to rewrite, because it affects none of the basic arguments that are put forward against Kant and in favour of Aristotle. On the other hand, this other concern would have resulted in at the least, a longer version of the final section of that chapter, exploring Kant's motivation to avoid empirical information in the first place from his ethics. I don't think that it would have added much to the actual conclusions drawn, but it would have broadened and deepened the understanding of Kant expressed in the chapter.
You already address a seeming contradiction in Kant in the thesis, which is preserved in the book. It seems to me that this contradiction is of a piece with this book about Kant's moral anthropology, and consideration of his work can be incorporated at that point. Given the fact that Frierson preserves the standard view of Kant as a rationalist who eschews the moral import of empiricism, all your original arguments are safe. You need only show that you acknowledge this difference with a nod to Frierson, and let that be the end of the discussion. So that's two things that you can rewrite about Chapter 2--although I find the task less than inspiring.
Well, the rewrite of Chapter 2 will not affect any of the claims made so far in Chapter 3. You can therefore keep writing Chapter 3, and at some point you can go back to rewriting Chapter 2. That leaves you in the meantime with looking up five superveience theorists from the library, whenever you're ready.
In that case, then what work has been done with moral anthropology?
Looking up "'moral anthropology' bibliography" on Google, I got this striking web page: The introduction to a forthcoming book by Patrick Frierson called Freedom and Anthropology in Kant's Moral Philosophy. It addresses an objection by Friedrich Schleiermacher to a work by Kant in 1798, called Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. The objection is that the work treats anthropology as having moral import, when Kant already makes clear in his Foundations that he is committed to claiming that anthropology can have no moral import. Perhaps this, then, was what the external reviewer meant by the "rather robust empiricism to be found in the Theory of the Virtues". In any case, the first chapter will have to take this view into account. It seems that Kant was not as rationalist as the standard interpretation of him makes him appear.
If I am going to rewrite Chapter 2 in this light, I will also have to address another concern. I have in fact rewritten the section of the thesis that dealt with Christian virtue, so that it is in line with Classical Greek virtue rather than Kantian virtue. I think that Kelley L. Ross makes a good point that Christian virtue is very much in keeping with Classical Greek virtue a la Plato. As such Kant was trying to rescue Christian ethics from this predicament. This was a relatively easy part of the chapter to rewrite, because it affects none of the basic arguments that are put forward against Kant and in favour of Aristotle. On the other hand, this other concern would have resulted in at the least, a longer version of the final section of that chapter, exploring Kant's motivation to avoid empirical information in the first place from his ethics. I don't think that it would have added much to the actual conclusions drawn, but it would have broadened and deepened the understanding of Kant expressed in the chapter.
You already address a seeming contradiction in Kant in the thesis, which is preserved in the book. It seems to me that this contradiction is of a piece with this book about Kant's moral anthropology, and consideration of his work can be incorporated at that point. Given the fact that Frierson preserves the standard view of Kant as a rationalist who eschews the moral import of empiricism, all your original arguments are safe. You need only show that you acknowledge this difference with a nod to Frierson, and let that be the end of the discussion. So that's two things that you can rewrite about Chapter 2--although I find the task less than inspiring.
Well, the rewrite of Chapter 2 will not affect any of the claims made so far in Chapter 3. You can therefore keep writing Chapter 3, and at some point you can go back to rewriting Chapter 2. That leaves you in the meantime with looking up five superveience theorists from the library, whenever you're ready.