An objection to subjectivism
There still seems to be an equivalent, under this conception of subjectivity, to the notion that somewhere thinking does make something so. We can still say that somewhere in our analysis of our values, we will reach a point of intrinsic satisfication with those values. The objection that was raised by the external reviewer would therefore apply in this situation. It is that awareness of this thesis may make people all too willing to believe far too early that they have reached this point.
Of course, as my supervisor pointed out, that is hardly a strong objection. How could undesirable practical consequences show that subjectivism is false? But let's have a little fun in analysing it nevertheless, in terms of the rules of transformation that I employ in converting an evaluative statement to a descriptive statement. What the reviewer is saying is that awareness of this thesis may make people willing to a degree much in excess of what he values, to believe quickly to a degree far in excess of what he values, that they have reached this point. This, of course, is another way of saying that he disvalues the practical consequences of the thesis of subjectivism.
I actually do not think that this objection should be taken lightly. After all, the claim that we have no reason to take ethics seriously or that moral arguments become illegitimate are also surely undesirable practical consequences to the notion of subjectivism. But objectivists seem clearly to believe that this gives them a strong incentive to reject subjectivism, which becomes significant to the debate against it. I think, in other words, that there is a strong objection lurking not too far underneath the surface of a seemingly weak objection there. In the thesis, I do indeed neutralise the undesirable practical consequence of subjectivism that we have no reason to take ethics seriously. In this blog, I also neutralise the undesirable practical consequence that moral arguments become illegitimate.
I think that this is really how you neutralise the external reviewer's objection then. Awareness of the thesis of subjectivism might indeed make people too willing to believe too early that they have reached the point where their values have become subjective. But this would only occur if they never entered moral arguments. It is very difficult to escape the intuitive compellingness of moral arguments, and this is what forces us to dig deeper into a justification of our values than we would normally be willing to dig. But this is the same kind of claim that could be made about any other kind of human belief, including metaphysical beliefs. Somewhere along the way, a belief in a God or no God, for example, becomes something that we are simply content with believing is true or false. Unless we were actually forced from time to time to argue the issue, we would have no reason prima facie to dig any deeper than that. Self-satisfication with beliefs in general, in other words, seems no different from self-satisfaction with values, whether or not those values are believed to be "subjective".
Of course, as my supervisor pointed out, that is hardly a strong objection. How could undesirable practical consequences show that subjectivism is false? But let's have a little fun in analysing it nevertheless, in terms of the rules of transformation that I employ in converting an evaluative statement to a descriptive statement. What the reviewer is saying is that awareness of this thesis may make people willing to a degree much in excess of what he values, to believe quickly to a degree far in excess of what he values, that they have reached this point. This, of course, is another way of saying that he disvalues the practical consequences of the thesis of subjectivism.
I actually do not think that this objection should be taken lightly. After all, the claim that we have no reason to take ethics seriously or that moral arguments become illegitimate are also surely undesirable practical consequences to the notion of subjectivism. But objectivists seem clearly to believe that this gives them a strong incentive to reject subjectivism, which becomes significant to the debate against it. I think, in other words, that there is a strong objection lurking not too far underneath the surface of a seemingly weak objection there. In the thesis, I do indeed neutralise the undesirable practical consequence of subjectivism that we have no reason to take ethics seriously. In this blog, I also neutralise the undesirable practical consequence that moral arguments become illegitimate.
I think that this is really how you neutralise the external reviewer's objection then. Awareness of the thesis of subjectivism might indeed make people too willing to believe too early that they have reached the point where their values have become subjective. But this would only occur if they never entered moral arguments. It is very difficult to escape the intuitive compellingness of moral arguments, and this is what forces us to dig deeper into a justification of our values than we would normally be willing to dig. But this is the same kind of claim that could be made about any other kind of human belief, including metaphysical beliefs. Somewhere along the way, a belief in a God or no God, for example, becomes something that we are simply content with believing is true or false. Unless we were actually forced from time to time to argue the issue, we would have no reason prima facie to dig any deeper than that. Self-satisfication with beliefs in general, in other words, seems no different from self-satisfaction with values, whether or not those values are believed to be "subjective".
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