Writing the book
I now consider that I have amassed enough research to fruitfully begin to write my book on an empirical theory of ethics. I am writing the book using OpenOffice.org Writer 1.1.0. Its major inconvenience is that it does not allow me to group endnotes by chapter, but it is a solid program, and it produces wonderfully small master files.
The first chapter will be an introduction that will provide nothing more than a synopsis of the chapters that follow, just as it was in the thesis. As such, it cannot be written until those chapters are written. The second chapter will be an amalgam of Chapters 2 and 3 in the thesis, called "Some Problems with Rationalism". I have made minor changes to the content of this chapter from its equivalent in the thesis, mainly to do with the nature of Christian virtue, but it does not influence any of the basic arguments.
The third chapter should, rightly, provide an adequate plan and foundation for the development of an empirical theory of ethics. I do not pretend that my approach is the only possible empirically based approach; Locke's and Marx's, for example, would seem equally valid prima facie.
Hold it right there! If your approach is not the only valid empirical approach to ethics, then should you even characterise it primarily as an "empirical" theory of ethics? In order to properly distinguish your approach from Locke's or Marx's, for example, you might want to characterise it according to what makes it different from theirs, rather than what makes it the same. Marx's is a theory that is based on an empirical thesis about history, for example, and Locke's is a theory that is based on human nature, specifically our likes and dislikes. As such, Marx's theory has a sociological basis and Locke's theory has a psychological basis. Your theory, with its emphasis on social mores as a key to moral progress, falls into the sociological category. This, I think, would be a far more fruitful approach than you adopted in your Masters thesis, where you tried to characterise what a pure empiricism in ethics would be like.
It seems to me, however, that this attempt to focus on pure empiricism was fruitful. After all, I am right to point out that many ethical theories (especially certain forms of utilitarianism) which claim to be empirical are so in intent only. These theories sometimes adopt a fundamental principle without any adequate empirical basis (Bentham). Sometimes they rely more or less wittingly on assumptions stemming from the history of ethics (Singer). I think your criticisms of Bentham and Singer are basically accurate, and when you go to characterise the different empirical approaches to ethics, you will want an adequate rationale to eschew utilitarianism from this group. In order to do this, it may be fruitful first to characterise what a pure empiricism actually is.
But in this regard, my basis for characterising it as a "pure empiricism" was my distinction between conception and intention of a theory. I thus argued that utilitarianism was conceived a priori and intended a posteriori. But I have already decided elsewhere that this characterisation of intention was flawed, and just an ad hoc way to introduce practicality into the thesis at an early stage. I agree that some argument is necessary to demonstrate why utiltiarianism is not a proper empirical theory of ethics, and Chapter 4 from your thesis covers this adequately. But it seems to me that this argument can be more rightly provided as part of a discussion to different empirical approaches to ethics. It does not need to be part of a section discussing a "pure empiricism" as such. I think that my characterisation of different empirical approaches to ethics will provide a solid foundation for the work that follows, and it will become another significant contribution to the book.
In this regard, of course, we will run into the inevitable fact/value distinction once again. In the thesis, this involved a discussion of moral observations, but I think that we would be better to leave that discussion until a full chapter on the subject can be covered. Indeed, it will probably be the first chapter to follow your characterisation of your empirical approach to ethics.
But if we leave that discussion for a later chapter, then how else could we resolve the difficulty raised by the fact/value distinction?
Well, in some respects, we can't. After all, even Robert Wright in The Moral Animal argues convincingly that values cannot be reduced to a species of facts, so that he cannot reduce ethics to Darwinian evolution. What he argues, instead, is that his anthropological conclusions in the book strongly suggest moral conclusions as well, and that he thinks that it will make his moral conclusions more persuasive. Besides, there are other ways that we can resolve the fact/value distinction in Chapter 3. For example, we can argue that just because an ought cannot be derived from an is, does not mean that it might not supervene over an is. After all, Moore lived after Hume did, so Hume does not have the benefits of Moore's insights into supevenience. And if we do decide that ethics supervenes over some parts of the empirical world, it is likely that some parts of this world will be more supervened over than others. For example, for Marx, the sociological aspects of the world are more supervened over, and for Locke, it is the psychological aspects that are. I think that this is an area rich for study, and it will strengthen your approach to consider it.
The first chapter will be an introduction that will provide nothing more than a synopsis of the chapters that follow, just as it was in the thesis. As such, it cannot be written until those chapters are written. The second chapter will be an amalgam of Chapters 2 and 3 in the thesis, called "Some Problems with Rationalism". I have made minor changes to the content of this chapter from its equivalent in the thesis, mainly to do with the nature of Christian virtue, but it does not influence any of the basic arguments.
The third chapter should, rightly, provide an adequate plan and foundation for the development of an empirical theory of ethics. I do not pretend that my approach is the only possible empirically based approach; Locke's and Marx's, for example, would seem equally valid prima facie.
Hold it right there! If your approach is not the only valid empirical approach to ethics, then should you even characterise it primarily as an "empirical" theory of ethics? In order to properly distinguish your approach from Locke's or Marx's, for example, you might want to characterise it according to what makes it different from theirs, rather than what makes it the same. Marx's is a theory that is based on an empirical thesis about history, for example, and Locke's is a theory that is based on human nature, specifically our likes and dislikes. As such, Marx's theory has a sociological basis and Locke's theory has a psychological basis. Your theory, with its emphasis on social mores as a key to moral progress, falls into the sociological category. This, I think, would be a far more fruitful approach than you adopted in your Masters thesis, where you tried to characterise what a pure empiricism in ethics would be like.
It seems to me, however, that this attempt to focus on pure empiricism was fruitful. After all, I am right to point out that many ethical theories (especially certain forms of utilitarianism) which claim to be empirical are so in intent only. These theories sometimes adopt a fundamental principle without any adequate empirical basis (Bentham). Sometimes they rely more or less wittingly on assumptions stemming from the history of ethics (Singer). I think your criticisms of Bentham and Singer are basically accurate, and when you go to characterise the different empirical approaches to ethics, you will want an adequate rationale to eschew utilitarianism from this group. In order to do this, it may be fruitful first to characterise what a pure empiricism actually is.
But in this regard, my basis for characterising it as a "pure empiricism" was my distinction between conception and intention of a theory. I thus argued that utilitarianism was conceived a priori and intended a posteriori. But I have already decided elsewhere that this characterisation of intention was flawed, and just an ad hoc way to introduce practicality into the thesis at an early stage. I agree that some argument is necessary to demonstrate why utiltiarianism is not a proper empirical theory of ethics, and Chapter 4 from your thesis covers this adequately. But it seems to me that this argument can be more rightly provided as part of a discussion to different empirical approaches to ethics. It does not need to be part of a section discussing a "pure empiricism" as such. I think that my characterisation of different empirical approaches to ethics will provide a solid foundation for the work that follows, and it will become another significant contribution to the book.
In this regard, of course, we will run into the inevitable fact/value distinction once again. In the thesis, this involved a discussion of moral observations, but I think that we would be better to leave that discussion until a full chapter on the subject can be covered. Indeed, it will probably be the first chapter to follow your characterisation of your empirical approach to ethics.
But if we leave that discussion for a later chapter, then how else could we resolve the difficulty raised by the fact/value distinction?
Well, in some respects, we can't. After all, even Robert Wright in The Moral Animal argues convincingly that values cannot be reduced to a species of facts, so that he cannot reduce ethics to Darwinian evolution. What he argues, instead, is that his anthropological conclusions in the book strongly suggest moral conclusions as well, and that he thinks that it will make his moral conclusions more persuasive. Besides, there are other ways that we can resolve the fact/value distinction in Chapter 3. For example, we can argue that just because an ought cannot be derived from an is, does not mean that it might not supervene over an is. After all, Moore lived after Hume did, so Hume does not have the benefits of Moore's insights into supevenience. And if we do decide that ethics supervenes over some parts of the empirical world, it is likely that some parts of this world will be more supervened over than others. For example, for Marx, the sociological aspects of the world are more supervened over, and for Locke, it is the psychological aspects that are. I think that this is an area rich for study, and it will strengthen your approach to consider it.
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