The language of values
I guess this comes down to issues of value theory and what constitutes values. It seems to me that the question of what values actually are is going to determine much about whatever normative theory of ethics a person may adopt. To me, values are, by definition, something on which you would act as a matter of course, simply because in being values, they are important to you. Conversely, if you did not act on them as a matter of course, then they would not be important to you, hence not your values.
Hence, there are real values and pretend values. This is what will lead to the claim that a real value is indeed a more, as opposed to mere hypocrisy. Faithful to the fact that hypocrisy comes from the Greek word hupokrisis, meaning playing a part or pretending, to be a hypocrite is to profess beliefs and opinions that you do not hold. The classic method of recognising a hypocrite is to note that she is in the habit of acting against her own professed ethics. Actions speak louder than words. If someone is in the habit of acting inconsistently with her professed values, then this constitutes evidence that she does not really value what she claims to value. She might claim that ethics consists in considering everyone's interests equally, but then give more support to her own family than to some group of strangers. Because her actions speak louder than her words, she must not really believe in that moral principle after all.
There are three basic components of value:
Expressed in ordinary language, value is always value (1) of something (2) to someone (3) for something. One can therefore express the abstract form of the predicate 'value' as 'agent values object for end', or 'A values O for E'. This approach also covers intrinsic value as 'A values O for O'--or, 'A values O for E where E=O'. This notion of value easily includes non-moral values, such as, for example, valuing a stereo for playing music.
The rest of this section will be an exercise to show how we can fit common evaluative statements into this model of the language of values, but I will not necessarily try to fit them all the way to the symbolic level described above.
We will also have to relate our usage of the words 'good' and 'right' to this conception of value. To consider that something is good is to value it, and to think that an action is right is to value performing it. One can therefore distinguish between doing the right thing and doing something that will bring about a good result. I consider that it won't always be the right thing that will bring about a good result, and that this can be the cause of moral dilemmas. One can also talk in terms of doing a good thing. I take it that in this case, one must distinguish between doing a good thing and doing the right thing. When one does the right thing, it presupposes that that is the only action of value that one could have performed under the circumstances. When one does a good thing, on the other hand, one did not have to perform that action, because other things might have been just as good to do if not more so. Hence, 'a good' action is not morally required, but 'the right' action is.
We also sometimes talk about what is right or wrong for other people. Persons A who oppose cultural relativism, for example, claim that persons B from other cultures can do things that it is wrong for them to be doing. In this case, the activity of persons B is of disvalue to persons A for its own sake. If persons A are being fair, presumably they also think that such activity of anyone is of disvalue to them for its own sake. Fairness could be characterised as some consistent application of the same values or disvalues, such as the treatment of similar cases similarly.
We can also talk about what is good for other people. What is good for other people is what is of value to us for them, independently of whether it is of value to them for themselves. Sometimes, however, we imply more than this when we say that something is good for other people. We suggest that, if they attain it, then it will also be of value to them and for them. Often when we talk of something as good for someone, we are also talking about specific properties of theirs that it will enhance, such as their health, wealth or happiness.
We must distinguish between value for someone and value for something. When we say that something is wrong for someone, this means something different from something's being wrong for something. Murder is wrong for anyone to do in the sense that the disvalue is against anyone's performing that action. But choosing the wrong colour of paint for a house is wrong, or of disvalue, for a particular purpose, or appreciation. One can use the two cases in combination, as the following example will illustrate. The claim that 'murder is wrong for anyone, for any purpose' can be stated as 'the action of anyone's committing murder' (O) is wrong (i.e. of disvalue) to any end (E). In other words, when we say that something is wrong for someone, then the 'for someone' occupies the O place. When we say that something is bad for someone, then that 'someone' is some E that relates to that someone, such as his health.
Hence, there are real values and pretend values. This is what will lead to the claim that a real value is indeed a more, as opposed to mere hypocrisy. Faithful to the fact that hypocrisy comes from the Greek word hupokrisis, meaning playing a part or pretending, to be a hypocrite is to profess beliefs and opinions that you do not hold. The classic method of recognising a hypocrite is to note that she is in the habit of acting against her own professed ethics. Actions speak louder than words. If someone is in the habit of acting inconsistently with her professed values, then this constitutes evidence that she does not really value what she claims to value. She might claim that ethics consists in considering everyone's interests equally, but then give more support to her own family than to some group of strangers. Because her actions speak louder than her words, she must not really believe in that moral principle after all.
There are three basic components of value:
- The object;
- The agent; and
- The end.
Expressed in ordinary language, value is always value (1) of something (2) to someone (3) for something. One can therefore express the abstract form of the predicate 'value' as 'agent values object for end', or 'A values O for E'. This approach also covers intrinsic value as 'A values O for O'--or, 'A values O for E where E=O'. This notion of value easily includes non-moral values, such as, for example, valuing a stereo for playing music.
The rest of this section will be an exercise to show how we can fit common evaluative statements into this model of the language of values, but I will not necessarily try to fit them all the way to the symbolic level described above.
We will also have to relate our usage of the words 'good' and 'right' to this conception of value. To consider that something is good is to value it, and to think that an action is right is to value performing it. One can therefore distinguish between doing the right thing and doing something that will bring about a good result. I consider that it won't always be the right thing that will bring about a good result, and that this can be the cause of moral dilemmas. One can also talk in terms of doing a good thing. I take it that in this case, one must distinguish between doing a good thing and doing the right thing. When one does the right thing, it presupposes that that is the only action of value that one could have performed under the circumstances. When one does a good thing, on the other hand, one did not have to perform that action, because other things might have been just as good to do if not more so. Hence, 'a good' action is not morally required, but 'the right' action is.
We also sometimes talk about what is right or wrong for other people. Persons A who oppose cultural relativism, for example, claim that persons B from other cultures can do things that it is wrong for them to be doing. In this case, the activity of persons B is of disvalue to persons A for its own sake. If persons A are being fair, presumably they also think that such activity of anyone is of disvalue to them for its own sake. Fairness could be characterised as some consistent application of the same values or disvalues, such as the treatment of similar cases similarly.
We can also talk about what is good for other people. What is good for other people is what is of value to us for them, independently of whether it is of value to them for themselves. Sometimes, however, we imply more than this when we say that something is good for other people. We suggest that, if they attain it, then it will also be of value to them and for them. Often when we talk of something as good for someone, we are also talking about specific properties of theirs that it will enhance, such as their health, wealth or happiness.
We must distinguish between value for someone and value for something. When we say that something is wrong for someone, this means something different from something's being wrong for something. Murder is wrong for anyone to do in the sense that the disvalue is against anyone's performing that action. But choosing the wrong colour of paint for a house is wrong, or of disvalue, for a particular purpose, or appreciation. One can use the two cases in combination, as the following example will illustrate. The claim that 'murder is wrong for anyone, for any purpose' can be stated as 'the action of anyone's committing murder' (O) is wrong (i.e. of disvalue) to any end (E). In other words, when we say that something is wrong for someone, then the 'for someone' occupies the O place. When we say that something is bad for someone, then that 'someone' is some E that relates to that someone, such as his health.
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