Kinds of falsification
Why are you so concerned about social mores?
Because they seem to be the most natural foundation for an empirical theory of ethics. If moral intuitions are experience-dependent, and viable ethics make for experientially grounded intuitions, then social mores should provide an ideal place to start for an empirical theory of ethics. Social mores are by definition viable ethics, and hence are prima facie a credible index of moral value.
Of course, one has to be careful how one formulates this approach. For example, we would not want to claim that the mores of Nazi Germany were a credible index of moral value. Nor would we want to claim that the mores in our society that existed before our present mores remain credible indices for values today, because we acknowledge that some mistakes or other were made in them that we have not made. But of course, this claim does presuppose that social mores progress. Nevertheless, my research strongly suggests that they do progress, and current indications seem to be that they progress through falsification, and not necessarily falsification of just one type. So in answer to your question from the previous section, this is why we have several different accounts of falsification. Any or all of them might serve to falsify social mores at different times. But I shall not endeavour to conceive of these types of falsification a priori, but rather a posteriori, so that I shall not employ them unless they can be conclusively shown to have caused social mores to change at an important point in the past. For example, the abolition of slavery provides strong support for the notion of falsification as falsified metaphysical presupposition.
You are right, however, that I do not as yet have empirical support for the notion of falsification to which I analogised in the previous section. In order to establish this support, I will have to identify an important instance of a social more changing due to either of the following facts:
I would not want to think that the latter event has ever occurred, however, because it sounds quite immoral. The reason for doing the right thing hardly seems to be to obtain a mere reward, although presumably it is unjust if the right thing actually gets punished.
Another kind of event is possible, whereby the action permitted by a more habitually goes rewarded. It would be interesting to observe whether this has ever changed a right into a duty, although I doubt it.
I don't feel inclined to look specifically for changes in mores that need to fit the above pattern, however. My empirical project instead will require me to look for instances where social mores change at all, and then I shall try to explain how the original forms of the mores were falsified. In that respect, the more models for falsifiability that I have, the better capable I will be of explaining at the outset how those mores changed.
Because they seem to be the most natural foundation for an empirical theory of ethics. If moral intuitions are experience-dependent, and viable ethics make for experientially grounded intuitions, then social mores should provide an ideal place to start for an empirical theory of ethics. Social mores are by definition viable ethics, and hence are prima facie a credible index of moral value.
Of course, one has to be careful how one formulates this approach. For example, we would not want to claim that the mores of Nazi Germany were a credible index of moral value. Nor would we want to claim that the mores in our society that existed before our present mores remain credible indices for values today, because we acknowledge that some mistakes or other were made in them that we have not made. But of course, this claim does presuppose that social mores progress. Nevertheless, my research strongly suggests that they do progress, and current indications seem to be that they progress through falsification, and not necessarily falsification of just one type. So in answer to your question from the previous section, this is why we have several different accounts of falsification. Any or all of them might serve to falsify social mores at different times. But I shall not endeavour to conceive of these types of falsification a priori, but rather a posteriori, so that I shall not employ them unless they can be conclusively shown to have caused social mores to change at an important point in the past. For example, the abolition of slavery provides strong support for the notion of falsification as falsified metaphysical presupposition.
You are right, however, that I do not as yet have empirical support for the notion of falsification to which I analogised in the previous section. In order to establish this support, I will have to identify an important instance of a social more changing due to either of the following facts:
- The action that it prohibited habitually went unpunished.
- The action that it permitted or required habitually went punished.
- The action that it required habitually went unrewarded.
I would not want to think that the latter event has ever occurred, however, because it sounds quite immoral. The reason for doing the right thing hardly seems to be to obtain a mere reward, although presumably it is unjust if the right thing actually gets punished.
Another kind of event is possible, whereby the action permitted by a more habitually goes rewarded. It would be interesting to observe whether this has ever changed a right into a duty, although I doubt it.
I don't feel inclined to look specifically for changes in mores that need to fit the above pattern, however. My empirical project instead will require me to look for instances where social mores change at all, and then I shall try to explain how the original forms of the mores were falsified. In that respect, the more models for falsifiability that I have, the better capable I will be of explaining at the outset how those mores changed.
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