A descriptive versus a prescriptive approach to values
In many ways, my notion of an empirical theory of ethics is taking a relatively descriptive approach towards moral value. Yet in many respects, it can be argued that this approach is incorrect. This seems to be because the goal of the ethicist is not merely to describe what people do value, but to pronounce a judgement about what they ought to value. Therefore, the objection of a typical ethicist to my approach would be that it is not a work of ethics, even if it is a work of moral anthropology.
Possibly all that I am writing is indeed a work of moral anthropology. But if I succeed in explaining why people do value what they value, then it seems to me that this will also constitute a contribution to ethics as well. It is simply that, in discovering the reasons and causes for why we value what we value, we will also be in a far better position to change some of our values in accordance with an awareness of this process. Hence, we will be in a better position to decide which values are legitimate and which are not.
But it seems to me that the descriptive and prescriptive approaches to value are merely two different perspectives on the same thing. We can say that what people value is not necessarily what they ought to value. Yet how on earth is this anything other than our simply saying that what people value is not necessarily what we value that they value? How are we doing anything other than simply claiming that their values are different from ours?
This is to claim that value judgements are reducible to descriptive statements. I agree that to take that tack seems compelling, but if you could do this, then you are committing yourself to denying that ethics supevenes over nature, in effect becoming a reductive naturalist.
I suppose so. I remember when I was first taught the difference between subjectivism and objectivism at university, and the tutor told me that all subjectivism meant was that "That is good" means "I like that". Put that crudely, of course subjectivism must be false, but it seems to me that the phrase "That is good" is decidedly ambiguous. It can mean, "I value that", but when used in contrast with the statement "I value that" it can mean "I value that (and I suspect others will as well)," and when used in an argument it can mean "I value that, and I value that you value it as well". Hence, prescriptive statements do supervene over descriptive statements. For if you know what the descriptive statements are about how people relate to their values and the values of others, then you also know what the corresponding prescriptive statements are that can be derived. But just because you know the prescriptive statement, it does not follow that you can infer the descriptive statement.
I am impressed by those transformations of "that is good", but what about the intermediary claim, "I think that that is good"?
What you are then saying is, "I think that I can justify valuing that".
But if you have to introduce the concept of justification, then how do you characterise that in terms that are plausibly descriptive?
To say that someone justifies something, is not to say that someone ought to justify something. Hence, the term 'justify' is definitely a descriptive term. To justify a value is simply to ground it in another value, but a value with no grounding at all is a value that will directly transform into a descriptive state of affairs.
Possibly all that I am writing is indeed a work of moral anthropology. But if I succeed in explaining why people do value what they value, then it seems to me that this will also constitute a contribution to ethics as well. It is simply that, in discovering the reasons and causes for why we value what we value, we will also be in a far better position to change some of our values in accordance with an awareness of this process. Hence, we will be in a better position to decide which values are legitimate and which are not.
But it seems to me that the descriptive and prescriptive approaches to value are merely two different perspectives on the same thing. We can say that what people value is not necessarily what they ought to value. Yet how on earth is this anything other than our simply saying that what people value is not necessarily what we value that they value? How are we doing anything other than simply claiming that their values are different from ours?
This is to claim that value judgements are reducible to descriptive statements. I agree that to take that tack seems compelling, but if you could do this, then you are committing yourself to denying that ethics supevenes over nature, in effect becoming a reductive naturalist.
I suppose so. I remember when I was first taught the difference between subjectivism and objectivism at university, and the tutor told me that all subjectivism meant was that "That is good" means "I like that". Put that crudely, of course subjectivism must be false, but it seems to me that the phrase "That is good" is decidedly ambiguous. It can mean, "I value that", but when used in contrast with the statement "I value that" it can mean "I value that (and I suspect others will as well)," and when used in an argument it can mean "I value that, and I value that you value it as well". Hence, prescriptive statements do supervene over descriptive statements. For if you know what the descriptive statements are about how people relate to their values and the values of others, then you also know what the corresponding prescriptive statements are that can be derived. But just because you know the prescriptive statement, it does not follow that you can infer the descriptive statement.
I am impressed by those transformations of "that is good", but what about the intermediary claim, "I think that that is good"?
What you are then saying is, "I think that I can justify valuing that".
But if you have to introduce the concept of justification, then how do you characterise that in terms that are plausibly descriptive?
To say that someone justifies something, is not to say that someone ought to justify something. Hence, the term 'justify' is definitely a descriptive term. To justify a value is simply to ground it in another value, but a value with no grounding at all is a value that will directly transform into a descriptive state of affairs.
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