Are moral intuitions really experience-dependent?

One of your most basic premises is that moral intuitions are experience-dependent, but how do you support this claim?

It was covered in "The experience-dependence of intuitions". Basically, if you don't practice what you preach, so that your moral intuitions do not come from your actual experience, then they will not be very strong or reliable.

What about the utilitarianism screamed by those bastards in that ridiculous argument? It seemed to me that it didn't matter what scenario you presented to them, they would simply continue to take the utilitarian line, hypocritically. That certainly sounds like the intuitions are strong and reliable, just not viable.

But then again, is what constitutes moral belief what you claim to believe in, or what you act on as a matter of course? I seem justified in claiming that their actions speak louder than their words.

But then you are in danger of going down a slippery slope. Are we to say that most recidivist criminals don't really think that there is anything immoral with, say, theft or rape?

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